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1.	The independence and the European Union


Among the republics of the former Yugoslavia, Montenegro has been the only one to reach its independence in a completely pacific way and under the surveillance of the international powers; not only they have recognized the legitimacy of the referendum held on May 21st 2006, but they have also established the minimum percentage of voters that would have made the consultation valid, decided who had the vote among the potential electors and even what qualified majority should have been necessary for a independence victory (1). Another important peculiarity that characterises this republic is the road that led to an exit from the federal state, much longer and complex than the ones the others had to use. Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia had detached from Yugoslavia both because of the fall of the communist regimes in Europe and the federal Constitution, that said that the auto-determination was a prerogative of constitutional peoples (2); consequently such a constitutional rule has been interpreted as a right of each republic’s eponymous population to detach unilaterally itself from the federation.

            When in 1991 Slovenia and Croatia used that constitutional “right”, the international community had recognized the new sovereign states already at the beginning of 1992 (3). On the other hand, in Montenegro – also because of the fear that war could get there too - the referendum on independence that had been held in March 1992 showed a majority of 95,94% people in favour of the union, despite the fact that only 66% of voters went actually to vote, because of the boycott of the vote by the national minorities and lots of people that sustained the independence idea, and did not think that this referendum was being held in democratic conditions. Such a result produced the continuation of the federal bond between Montenegro and Serbia for another 16 years. During that time, there are two phenomena that we should analyze: the political one concerning the relationship with the international community, and the one concerning population’s identity. Both have conditioned the birth of Europe’s most recent sovereign state.

From a political point of view, from 1992 to 2006 Montenegro progressively loosened relations with Serbia (see Vučetić, 2003, pp. 78-82), while intensifying those with the West, wanting to assume a profile of a democratic country that is well inserted into the economically advanced world. The turning point in such a situation was the 1997 election of Milo Ðukanović to president of republic; he was preferred to the other candidate, Momir Bulatović, very close to Milošević. Other significant stages have been the refusal of Podgorica to take part in the Kosovo war, and also allowing Kosovo refugees in Montenegrin territory; yet, such a choice did not save Montenegro from Nato bombing campaign in Spring of 1999. Another sign of Montenegro distancing from Belgrade, that together with its economical-financial value had also a strong impact from a symbolical point of view, was the proclamation of fiscal sovereignty in Autumn of that same year; (see Caspersen, 2003, pp. 109-110) that meant abandoning the Yugoslav dinar as legal currency, in favour of the German mark, that has been substituted by the Euro since January 1st 2002; the will to get closer to the EU and to the West generally speaking could not have been more obvious. But the act that made the last and fundamental step to the independence, was the revision of the federal relation with Serbia known as the Belgrade Agreement that had been established on March 14th 2002 and became legal on February 4th 2003 after the creation of a new Constitution. With such a redesigning of relations between the two republics, Yugoslavia stopped existing also as a name and the state had been assimilated as a sort of confederation of two almost sovereign republics, except for the common Foreign policy, the defence of federal borders, human rights and foreign trading (see van Meurs, 2003, pp. 63-82). In regard to that, it is important to highlight here that such a political evolution, together with the Montenegrin choice to have an independence referendum, did not happen with bilateral negotiations, but with the interfering of the “strong” international powers, whose representative institutions did not just settle with a role of a notary mediator between the two subjects involved, but participated in an active way, by analyzing deeply the negotiations and by imposing on them. As already had happened with the Bosnian war and other Balkan crisis of the ’90-s, the Western society had showed all of its political power to the two republics, in this case through Javier Solana, the EU Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The agreement which came out of it established that each republic would commit to stay in the new federation for at least three years; only once that period expired, it could declare its own independence, even without the other republic’s consent. The European part wanted to avoid an immediate secession of Montenegro, that could have invited Bosnia’s Republika Srpska and Kosovo to follow its steps, with the risk of a new destabilization of the region (see Huszka, 2003, p. 43). Therefore, in exchange for this three year delay that the EU would guarantee, the EU got the fact that Podgorica’s republic renounced its independence already in 2002. Besides from the political preoccupations, EU did not like at all the prospective of having an international free port with sovereign rights in the Mediterranean area, and that could have become the collector of goods coming from outside of the Community, ready to be smuggled into the Community’s territory. So, it is worth noticing how in Montenegro – as more generally in the rest of the Western Balkans – the major powers, all of them non from the Balkans, interfere in a way similar to the way the Great Powers did at the time of the Berlin Congress. After decades of Cold War, where there relationships between the two blocks and between single member states have been perfectly symmetrical and where Yugoslavia, equally distant from each one as a non-Aligned country, found itself inserted quite symmetrically in such a system, the relations between its republics with the strong West have redefined dramatically, and this contributed also to transforming the everyday life of its inhabitants. When the short illusion of a “Europe without frontiers” that came out after the Fall of the Berlin Wall vanished, the strategic function of the boundary declined, while it was introduced police watching and guarding it; there was an intent of contrasting the private immigration from a East Europe not anymore militarily threatening but “poor”, towards a West empowered by its being a Community and not willing at all to have its wealth menaced. Inside the EU, from an internal de-bordering, an external re-bordering was established, like a “right to enclosure” against a potential “external disorder”. This process completed on May 7th 2002, when Bruxelles decided to establish a unique system of rigid external boundaries watched by Community frontier guards (Andreas, 2003, p. 101, in Vitale 2005). Is is easily understandable that such an initiative contributed to the damaging of the Treaty of Rome, that was signed in order to guarantee “a major and tighter union between the European peoples”; in fact, there is no reference in it of exclusion criteria that could damage some country that could want to integrate into the Community (see Vitale, 2005, p. 103, n. 2). In other words, since the EU had established unilaterally a heavy visa regime that was suppose to regulate the access to its territory for the inhabitants of the Western Balkans and of the republics of the ex SSR – but that de facto makes it extremely hard, if not impossible – it is acting exactly as a traditional territorial state, that puts the frontiers defence among its national priority interests. The peoples of the countries in these two macro-regions, not only because of their exclusion from the EU in short term, but especially because of the impossibility to move in 27 countries of the continent, find themselves imprisoned in a sort of Europe’s black hole, that has no reason to exist not even in the economical logics of the international market, that prefer the free flow of people and goods to restrictions of open spaces.  Besides, such heavy asymmetrical restrictions to people moving that have been introduced in the ‘90s, and that are particularly hard to bear for the ex Yugoslav states such as Bosnia and Hercegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and, of course, Montenegro – they represent a degrading step back if compared to the age of Federal Yugoslavia with six republics, when this state, one of leaders of the Non-Aligned ones, had an undeniable international prestige, both West and in the Communist world.
    On March 15th 2007, Montenegro’s Prime Minister Željko Šturanović and Olli Rehn, Europe’s Commissioner for Enlargement, have signed in Podgorica the preliminary phase of the agreement that will lead in a near future to the “stabilisation and association agreement” (ASA) between Montenegro and EU. Montenegro started the negotiations together with Serbia on October 10th 2005, but they were interrupted in May 2006 because of the lack of Serbia’s collaboration with the Hague International Tribunal (ICTY), in order to capture the remaining free war criminals. Despite the fact that after Montenegro left the federal system, the negotiations were resumed until the first step of the agreement that was concluded in March, it is important to notice however that the conditions of an eventual entrance into the EU are entirely established by EU only, and do not concern just political questions, but also the juridical, economical and generally cultural spheres. What can easily be seen is that this is not an “au pair” reciprocal approaching, but a possible entrance to a system in which one part only dictates the rules, while the other is obliged to accept everything in order not to stay in a international political, economical and territorial isolation.
Despite the realisation of the first phase of the negotiations towards the ASA, the perspectives of a rapid integration of Montenegro into the EU are not encouraging. After a Europe’s noticeable enlargement to a number of 25, the International Commission on the Balkans, whose chairman was Giuliano Amato, had published in 2005 a report which highlighted, in the general interest, the necessity to annex rapidly to the EU the countries in the region in order to solve area problems. Such a position was confirmed the year after in Rome with a declaration of the members of the Commission (published online on 11-05-2006 at www.osservatoriobalcani.org (​http:​/​​/​www.osservatoriobalcani.org​) ); it contained critics to the European leaders that failed to live up to promises made in 2003 in Thessaloniki – to allow rapidly the Western Balkans into the EU. In that occasion in Rome the Commission warned that the EU would be perceived as a sort of colonial power by the inhabitants of the region, while the Balkans would be dangerously close to “become a ghetto at the borders of EU”. On the other hand, in a study of June 1st 2005 (see www.esiweb.org (​http:​/​​/​www.esiweb.org​) ), the ESI (European Stability Initiative) said that even if the ASA with Serbia and Montenegro should have been concluded before 2006, the entrance of the two republics into the EU would not have happened before 2020, considering a long list of steps that have to be made afterwards, and so they proposed a quicker road-map that could have allowed to arrive to an integration around 2014-15.
However these deadlines are way to long to wait for Montenegro, that once it got independent, took a pro-European and pro-Atlantic road, since the admission to NATO seems actually an obligatory step to make in order to be allowed into EU, as already had happened with the states of the ex Warsaw Pact. In fact, in the little Adriatic state we can find a quantitatively relevant urban population, cultured according to standards that are not inferior to the Western ones, and that already at the beginning of the ’90-s – not diversely from the Bosnian population in Sarajevo and Tuzla – did not identify itself with the nationalist waves that appeared in large part of the Yugoslav society. Such a tendency could explain partially the 1992 referendum result, not favourable to the independence; in fact, beyond the tension atmosphere that surrounded the voting, people chose to remain in the federation, not much in the name of a Serb identity to be faithful to, but because they did not feel close to the nationalist actions of Slovenia and Croatia that opened the way to secessions.  This interpretation could be confirmed by the results of the 1991 census, the last one made contemporarily in all Yugoslav republics, when in Montenegro only about 9% of the population declared itself as Serb. 


2. Civic nation and ethnical nation: a comparison


   Since 1997, with Ðukanović’s victory at the elections against Bulatović, the distancing from Milošević’s policy that corresponded to a progressive approaching to the West that continued in the new Millennium, contributed to a consolidation of the independence project, which has been transmitted to the public opinion by the leading political forces – headed by Ðukanović. Despite the fact that the steps towards independence were induced by political and economical motivations, they were accompanied by a new sui generis national feeling, not at all different from virulent nationalisms in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans (see Smith, 1998, pp. 291-300). It is a civic nationalism, that was functional to the constitution of a multicultural community that could identify itself in the state, and that included also ethnical and religious minorities.  The reaction to such a program, the ones in favour of the Union – mainly Orthodox Slavs – recognized themselves in the Serbian nation, and gave basically a regional value to the Montenegrin identity, that was territorially limited to the region of antique historical Montenegro (Bieber, 2004, p. 84), that excludes the north mountain areas of the ex Sandžak of Novi Pazar, the eastern municipalities close to the borders with Albania and Kosovo, and the coast that remained under the Habsburg family rule until 1918. Therefore, the debate regarding the independence considered as a useful instrument that could bring Montenegro closer to the rest of Europe, contributed to a redesign of the concept of Montenegrin identity among its inhabitants, and gave credit to the famous thesis of B. Anderson, that affirmed that the nations exist because they are “imagined communities”. The evolution of the identities that begun in the ’80-s and the ’90-s of the XX century, and whose entirely political nature was so obvious (see Bieber, 2002, p. 6), came out very clearly in occasion of the 2003 census: among the Slav and Orthodox inhabitants that make about 75% of the population, 3 out of 7 – almost 32% against the 1991 result, 9% - declared themselves as Serbs (source: Republic of Montenegro, Statistical Office, Podgorica, 2006).  In such a situation of political schism in the Slav element of the republic, where the contrast got a ethno-national dimension, the highest political powers in Montenegro would never have succeeded in their intent of annulment of federal relations with Belgrade only with the consent of 43% of the population that should have defined themselves as “Montenegrins”.  Therefore, the participation in this project of the Bosnjak, Muslim, Albanian and Catholic – Croat minorities became a necessity. So, a hypothesis of a multicultural state was born; it was to be a Western Europe patterned state, and every citizen could identify himself in it no matter the language, religion or his mother culture. In regard to that, it is interesting to notice how the Montenegrin case is far different from the Slovenian and Croat state-nation pattern.
       However, today, about a year after the independence, a full integration of all its inhabitants into a unique cultural system that does not contemplate any differentiations and that confines to a private sphere the manifestation of ethnical and national identities – according to a pattern that can be compared to the French one – is still not realized, and no signals announcing such evolution are visible.
    There is a particularly high intra-ethnical tension – at least according to the point of view of Montenegro Serbs – between them and the relative majority of habitants that think of Montenegrin nation as something different from the Serb one. It is not possible to see these as two different communities, since the line that divides the one and only Slav and Orthodox population is mainly political, and quite weak; in fact, such a distinction started manifesting itself only in the late ’80-s with the federal state crisis. However both components, looking for a clear and visible identity especially after the independence, have accentuated the elements that divide them, or that are wanted to be the ones to divide them.
   As a consequence, since 1993 we have two Orthodox Churches in Montenegro: the Archdiocese of Montenegro and of the Littoral, belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (CPC), restored after its suppression in 1920. They do not recognize each other and have lead about fifteen years of “cold war” (see Koprivica, 2007), during which they contended legally and politically for the religious buildings of the country; in regard to that, the new CPC has been accused by many Serbs of being an organization supported by the government and of wanting to gain possession of religious buildings currently in SPC’s property (Sadiković, 2006).
The other element that can be used to characterize the Serb and Montenegrin identity is the language, although until the ’90-s it was the same: the Serb-Croatian, in the ijekavski variant of the štokavski dialect (coming from interrogative pronoun što? = what?), used generally by the Montenegrin Slavs, while in Serbia we have the ekavska variant. For this reason the linguistic differentiation had to be manifested with the choice of the alphabet, in order to make it visible; while before both Cyrillic and Latin alphabet could be used (see Violante, 2005, p. 227), integrated with appropriate phonetic signes, after the accentuation of two distinct national identities, the Cyrillic was the choice of the Serbs and Latin the one of the Montenegrins.


3. The cultural and political mosaic of border regions


The fact that the referendum result alimented ethnical tensions is a reality, especially in the multiethnic north of the country, where – according to Sead Sadiković’s analyses (2006) – 45% of the population are Serbs, 38% Bošnjak (= Muslims) and 20% Montenegrins (4). In that part of the country, the majority of Serbs supported those in favour of the Union and the Bošnjaks opposed such a position, while Montenegrins have stayed in the middle. However, in the north areas with a Bošnjak majority, the most part of Montenegrins were in favour of the continuation of the Union, while in those populated mostly by Christians, the Montenegrins have manifested an independence-liking orientation (ibid.).
     Beyond the fluidity of not only political preferences, but also of ethno-national identities not yet consolidated after the independence, there could be another way of interpretation of such choices that appear to be paradox. The north of Montenegro corresponds to the southern part of the historical Sandžak of Novi Pazar, which has been shared with Serbia after the Balkan wars of 1912-13, and both then and now, inhabited by a prevalently Slav population, some of them Orthodox and some other Muslims. So, both Christians and Muslims of the Montenegrin part of the Sandžak feel culturally similar to their religious brothers of the Serbian part of it; but for the Orthodox, the Serbian identity gains solidity by the presence of millions of Serbs in Serbia that see in the Orthodox Christianity their national religion, while they see no significant value in a Montenegrin identity, that, on the other hand, is very strong in the central areas of the country, the ones that in XVIII and XIX century represented the historical heartland of the Principate around the capital city of Cetinje, internationally recognized at the Berlin Congress. Contrarily, for the bošnjaks – Muslims, the identity coming from a religious affinity with the Muslims from the Serbian part of Sandžak is something secondary compared to a not so flattering perspective of being a part of a country – even if it is a federal one – that is hegemonized, at least for demographical reasons, by the Serbian nation. We also have the different case of Montenegrins, constantly present in the north, despite of being a minority. Their preferences to the Union in the districts with a bošnjak – Muslim majority, such as Plav and Rožaje, can be explained with a major affinity felt for their religious Serbian brothers, also in favour of the Union, than for the Muslims in favour of the independence; on the contrary, in places where we have a Christian predominance, as for example in Pljevlja, given the low Muslims’ influence, the Montenegrins chose the independence, wishing to distinguish themselves from the Serbs, rigorously favourable to the Union, according to a contraposition entirely limited to Orthodox religion themes.
  Senad Dlakić, leader of the bošnjak in Bijelo Polje, thought ironic the fact that the Serbian community, whose members make the majority of local government, is being hostile towards the state they represent; while on the contrary, according to his interpretation, the bošnjak  component is manifesting loyalty towards the Montenegrin state, although they have a very low number of representatives in the public administration (ibid.). Positions such as this one make us see a political position that is not keen on renouncing to the recognition of the ethno-national and religious components that make a minority in the country; however such a step, if accepted, could contribute to a formation of a civic nationalism where all the habitants have, not only formally, same citizenship rights, but where the citizenship correspons perfectly to the concept of nationality. Such a situation occurs, from a juridical point of view, and in common culture, in most part of the European West; and if it should occur also in Montenegro, it would make no citizen of the country “more Montenegrin” of another, because of having a nationality (domovnica) that could match a juridical-political citizenship.  

4. Citizens’ rights and minorities rights

An official recognition of the minorities – not that much linguistical (the right to use your own mother language can not realistically be denied to nobody) but ethno-national ones -  with constituencies ad hoc that could guarantee certain number of representatives in the Parliament, and a quote of working positions in the public administration, ecc. – could start again those ethnic tensions, that would be better for everything to leave behind. More specifically, in order not to go back to separatisms and claims that lead to the fratricide battles which ruined Yugoslavia, the state of Montenegro should be built as a state based on a territorial nation that should have a cultural community capable of recognizing itself in it, not very different from what happened with Great Britain, France and Spain, according to A.D. Smith; these states became national states and not nation-states (1998, pp. 287-289). This was possible, according to Smith’s analyses, by making “territorial nation” a “mass educational project”, whose goal could be only “cultural homogeneity” (ibid., p. 283). Consequently, the new Adriatic state, if made by following such principles, could identify itself in the demos and not in the ethnos, differently from what happened in other states-nations of the ex Yugoslavia. This can not be considered as an easy goal to achieve, considering that not even the European states we mentioned before, that started this process centuries ago, are immune from tensions with national communities and other internal minorities. When it comes to Montenegro, we could add that, while the common citizenship with formal equality of rights for all its habitants is defined by law, in the new state that is wished to be  national and not a state-nation, the necessary premises should be – according to Tatjana Sekulić’s analysis (2002, p. 26) of the ethno-national fragmentation of the Yugoslav society – “mass society, where feelings of solidarity are gained and renewed through the social and political participation of the citizens, and it is transmitted, with the aid of standardized educational programs, almost as a new “civil religion”. 
    However, it is very much likely that the “new” Montenegrin nation could be built subsequently to the state, following the Western patterns, if we consider the precedent state tradition of Montenegro, that has become a sovereign and multicultural country already become it had been absorbed in an “ethnical” state such as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. The independence tradition that can be used as foundation is a Montenegrin peculiarity, since already with the territorial enlargements gained after the Berlin Congress (5), in the Principality, thousands of Muslims and Catholics got the citizenship, and despite the fact that the official religion of State was the Orthodoxy, they had the same political, civil and religious rights of the majority cultural component.
        Nonetheless, there are no clear signs of a full “Western-like” evolution of the state, which is still conditioned mainly by ethnical values, instead by a “civic identity” of its population (Pavlović, 2003, pg. 105). That can be seen if we consider, for example, the statements of Senad Dlakić about a month after the independence. He wished for the bošnjak community to be able to exercise fully its constitutional right to a proportional representation in schools, tribunals, municipal administration and also in central administration, considering the Serbian supremacy that this Muslim politician felt until then (Sadiković, 2006). Still, such a choice – to favour once again collective rights instead of civic rights that are individual by definition – could contribute to a renewal of separation and ethnical contrasts, as already had happened in the past of Federal Yugoslavia. In regard to that, S. Bianchini said that in the communist state “ …. By guaranteeing space only for collective rights of the population, every right was being denied to the citizen and to individuals”. (6) A multicultural society, such as Montenegrin, could have more possibility of affirmation without falling into the trap of conflicts and ethnical and nationalist claims, if only it managed to keep separated cultural and political identities. Montenegro should become successful by avoiding a situation where the loyalty of its habitants towards institutions is conditioned by cultural differences, or where that loyalty leads to the disappearance of minority cultures in favour of the majority ones. If that should happen, and if the minorities should be pushed into asking for certain rules of protection to be approved, they could only consider the state as an adversary, and they would have to defend themselves through protective legislation; but this is not the right way for a modern country to become strong; in regard to that, we can easily see the case of Bosnia, “born” with the Dayton Agreement; if on one hand this Agreement stopped an absurd war, on the other, it trapped the country into a Constitution and into an institutional system that made impossible a correct functioning which was in everyone’s interest, because of the fact that it contemplated the partition of the state into rigid ethno-national communities; each community has interdiction powers towards the others; in fact, every proposal of innovation is usually interpreted not by considering its general utility, but as something that favours one rival national community and damages your own.
  On the contrary, the road which Montenegro should follow in order to become a “civic “ state, following the Western pattern, as the parliamentary majority wishes (7) and also its own government, goes through a complete juridical equity of all its habitants, but without the introduction of previously established “quota”, reserved for the minorities, of representatives in politics, in schools and in public administration, except of course freedom of religion and language (8). In fact, even if the “quota” legitimizes the minorities, it also reveals their weakness towards the central State body, and it makes obvious that the minority communities need an ad hoc legislation that makes their member citizens “different” from the ones that recognize themselves in the national majority, if they want to be noticed; it can be compared to a species at risk of extinction that needs to be protected in order to survive (9). Nonetheless, the minorities have protested because in the new constitution draft there are no parliament seats reserved for them, and their representative parties reproached the DPS (Democratic Socialists’ Party of Montenegro / Demokratska Partija Socijalista)  for receiving an offer of this reserved seats during the referendum campaign. More specifically, the DPS had promised three seats to the Bošnjak party, because of the fact that they were capable of attracting a part of the 15% of the total voters, that were Muslims (Softić, 2007).
      However, what makes Montenegro’s case a paradox and perhaps unique in the world, is the fact that there were no inter-ethnical or inter-national contrasts, as had happened in the other ex-Yugoslav republics, but intra-ethnical (Caspersen, 2003, passim), with an internal division among the Slav and Orthodox habitants – that make over 70% of the population – and that reveals its political origins, those in favour of the Union that identified themselves as Serbs and those in favour of the independence, identified as Montenegrins; in such groups, identity is a personal choice, and the “ethnical” division can happen even inside families (Šístek, Dimitrovová, 2003, p. 159).
    Inside this contrast between Orthodox Slavs, according to the leader of people in favour of independence, Ðukanović, and a speech he held in October 2001 at the DPS congress, without a full sovereignty Montenegro would have been condemned to disappearance both as state and nation; and more, in a precedent speech, the ex president hinted that what had to be preserved was the state’s national identity, and not the identity of the Montenegrin nation (Caspersen, 2003, p. 117). From such positions, Ðukanović’s intentions can easily be seen, and they were confirmed by the events that happened in the following years; he did not want to create a state with ethnical bases, considering the ambiguous nature of Montenegrin identity (ibid.).
   On the contrary, according to the point of view of who considers himself Serb and lives in Montenegro, there can be a Montenegrin identity, but only on regional basis. That can easily be verified by observing the site online of the Serbian nationalists in Montenegro, “Serb Land of Montenegro. History of Montenegro as it is”. At www.njegos.org/faq.htm (​http:​/​​/​www.njegos.org​/​faq.htm​) we can find sentences such as Montenegro is a “tiny Serb land”. And more, there is a paragraph, taken from Prince Danilo’s 1852 codex (paragraph 92), but used for present political debate without considering its context, historically different and chronologically remote; it says: 
” Although there is no other nationality in this land except Eastern Orthodoxy, each foreigner and each person of different faith can live here and enjoy the same freedom and the same domestic right as Montenegrin or Highlander.”
   What caused the mistake of a inappropriate separation between the two identities in Montenegro was the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, that was responsible of the violent imposition of a Montenegrin nation after the World War II. And finally, the website embraces the thesis that says : there are Serbs that are not Montenegrin, while there are no Montenegrins that in a certain way are not also Serbs. 

5. Debate over the Constitution

The inspiration principles that will give their characteristic shape to the new state are now animating the political and cultural debate, a year after the independence, since the definitive editing of the Constitution (10) is not finished yet; in order to be approved, it must get 2/3 favourable votes in the Parliament, or eventually be confirmed with a referendum if it gets a Parliament simple majority (see Rudović, 2007, a). Among the constitutional themes that are still on the table, there is also the one concerning the language, since the “Montenegrin” historically never existed, and the country used the Serb or Serb-Croatian in its regional versions. However, there was the intention to make it official as a brand new language, since there was the need to give to the new country its own national language, exactly as most of the European states have. In fact, the linguistic factor is one of the most suitable means that reinforce national identity, that becomes more distinguished the more it is distanced from those who do not belong to the nation (see Pierre-Caps, 2001, p. 39). So, wanting to make the new idiom different from Serb, and considering the versions that are only territorial of the language that do not follow “ethnical” or “national” guidelines, the Latin alphabet has been chosen, and preferred to the Cyrillic because the second one is used by the Serbs. In regard to that, we must consider that, if on one hand, the attribution of an official language could boost a disaffection towards the state among Serbian, Croat and Albanian national and linguistic minorities, that could not see the Montenegrin language as an identity element, but only as a discrimination of their communities, on the other there are European states that are institutionally strong and have solid identity bases – but do not have a “national” language. There is Austria’s case, that has German language, although with some real changes if compared with the language used in Germany, but this lack of an “Austrian” language did not damage the political and cultural identity of the country. Also in Italy, until the 482 law of 1999, the Italian language has never been officially recognized as Italian state language, and the Constitution does not mention nothing of sort; the late official introduction of the Italian has been done only as a counterbalance, in a legislative picture that was finalized to a defence and promotion of the use of minority languages, and therefore in a context that was everything but of “national” cultural hegemony.
   In my opinion, the “civic” character of the state would be accentuated with the elimination of omission of any kind of “national” type reference in which the habitants of minority communities would not be able to identify themselves. Following the same guideline, there was the intervention of prof. Mijat Šuković, regarding the future Constitution, and published on Pobjeda on April 16th 2007. He agrees with the necessity to build a civic state, and accordingly would prefer to explicit in the constitutional text that “Montenegro is the state of all its citizens”, in order not to leave any space to possible misinterpretations. And more, he thinks that it is necessary to eliminate the first part of the proposed preamble, where there is mentioned the right of the Montenegrin people to a state. In fact it says: “ Proceeding from the historic right of  Montenegrin people to a free state…..” and it follows the preamble of the 1992 Constitution of Republic of Montenegro, only substituting “its own” with “free”. In fact, if on one side a different adjective offers the bases for an interpretation of state’s nature as “less national”, such a definition maintains however a certain dose of ambiguity when it comes to “the right to a state” of “the Montenegrin people”; national minorities could fail to identify themselves in that terms. So, Šuković suggests – and I think opportunely – that mentioning “rights” should be avoided, and he prefers referring to the creation of the state of Montenegro, that is a “fact”. So, according to him, it would be more opportune to explicit when and who created the state of Montenegro, since the country’s right to exist as a state has been guaranteed by referendum results, the admission to ONU and international recognition. Therefore, the professor proposed this preamble:
” Proceeding from the historic fact that Montenegro was formed during fights for freedom of Montenegrin people in past centuries,  and from the fact that since the end of XIX, during XX century and until present days, the members of all national communities that live in it, have created, developed and reinforced together the civic values in the state and in its regulations, and with it they have showed their will for the state of Montenegro to grow and be reinforced as the state of all its citizens”.
      In this way, the “civic state” nature of Montenegro would become obvious, and it would distinguish it from its neighbour countries, that legitimized themselves as states of their eponymous peoples , as it happened with Slovenia and Croatia.
      The wish for Montenegro to be on the first place a state of citizens and not of populations, arrived also from the president of the Parliament, Ranko Krivokapić, in an interview published on Vijesti on February 9th 2007; he confirmed that the citizen will be the bearer of sovereignty, and that more importance will be given to individual rights instead of collective ones. Differently from Šuković, he says himself in favour of the Constitution preamble that says that the state was formed as the state of Montenegrin people; he denies that the Serbs can hope to have the status of “ constituent people”, because of the civic characteristics that the state must have. However, even when he affirmed that the Montenegrin language will be made official with an apposite constitutional paragraph, he said himself in favour of use of Serb, Croatian and Bosnian; but such a position does not consider the fact that the four languages he mentions are actually the same one, that assumed various names in order to become as the national languages used in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia – and they are almost identical, and have all been called Serb-Croatian until the end of the ’90-s – countries that give the origins to the Slav Montenegrin minorities. In fact, the linguistic varieties in Montenegro – except for Albanian – have been all territorial, as in Bosnia until the ‘90s, without  being derivates from different nationalities of the population.




6 The language problem


In Montenegro as an independent state, re-born after almost a century, language is being perceived as a fundamental factor of identity, even in front of the fact that the other states – once constitutive republics of the Yugoslav federation – have had for long time (Serbia, Slovenia and FYROM) or have introduced it opportunely in the occasion of independence (Croatia and Bosnia), their own national language. So, this is an anomaly to be solved for the ruling politicians, the fact that, according to the 1992 Constitution that is still in force, a year after the independence, the country’s official language is the Serb, even if it is its “jekavska” version. Such a situation can not be accepted by the parliament majority and by the government, since a paradox has been created: the country’s language is the national minority’s language, and the latter was hostile to the independence project and has tried to contrast it in every way they could.
     Such a contradiction, of the majority language in the country that coincides in its name – even if not de facto – with Serbia’s national language, induced the government majority to demand the recognition of Montenegrin as the state’s official language in the new Constitution; according to Branko Banjević, the president of Matrica Crnogorska, if that should not be the case, the sense of national identity would weaken (Vijesti, January 27th 2007). This organisation’s secretary, Marko Špadijer, said that the major political burden is still the “superserbian nationalism” (11), whose representatives insist on the project of unification of all Serbian countries and of spiritual assimilation of Montenegrins. He also said that it would not be convenient to leave spaces that could be an incentive to Serbian cultural hegemony, because that would boost other nationalisms and Montenegrin sovereignty would be de facto in danger. However, the majority parties have withdrawn the request of recognition in the Constitution of Montenegrin as official language (Rudović, 2007, b). Such a change of course can easily be explained if we consider that a recognition of Montenegrin as national language would have been refused not only by the Serbs, explicitly hostile to the independence of the republic, but also by other national and linguistic minorities, whose support was decisive for the referendum victory of May 21st 2006. 




In regard to a more generic theme – the Constitution – the national minorities, as we said before, have said themselves unhappy about its proposed variants. According to Suljo Mustafić, the president of the Directive Committee of the Bošnjak Forum, in his speech at the debate “Towards the Constitution” organized in Podgorica on January 25th 2007 by “The Initiative of  the Young for Human Rights” (see Pobjeda, 26-01-2007), when it comes to minorities’ rights, we are way behind both compared to the 1992 Constitution and the Human Rights and Minorities Chart of 2003. In that same occasion, the Albanians’ representative in Montenegro, Nail Draga, highlighted the fact that the Albanians do not want to become a ghetto but to get integrated, but with their own identity, and he expressed his wish for a recognition of well defined collective rights regarding language, education, information and also proportional representatives in state’s organs (see Delfau, 2005, pp. 212-214). He said that in civic states, the concepts of “national minority” and “ethnic group” belong to the past, while there exist only citizens that belong to different populations; then he demanded the substitution of these obsolete definitions with “minority peoples” in the new Constitution. The Rom were represented by Ivan Toskić from the Rom Democratic Centre; they demanded to have the status of “national minority”, a formula that since the federal Yugoslav system gave bigger rights compared to the “ethnic group”, a status that the Rom people had until 2007; more particularly, they asked for a secure parliament representatives quote, and more visibility, guaranteed by the use of their own language, that is in risk of extinction, in state’s media. Also, the Croat minority in Montenegro represented by Pavle Jurina, demanded opportune legislative measures in order to ensure the same rights of the Montenegrins and other minority populations that live in Croatia.
      Such positions as the ones we examined, both coming from ethnic Montenegrins and minorities, make us see that there is no agreement yet about the making of a civic state whose priority is the full integration of all its citizens. On the other hand, the Montenegrin part prefers accentuating the “national” identity of the state, giving public credit to the CPC and upgrading Montenegrin language to state language. Also, the fact that the independent Montenegro has not been denominated “the national state of the Montenegrins” is nothing pleasant for the ethnic Montenegrins such as Miodrag Vukotić, a member of the parliament from the DPS party (Softić, 2007). 





    There are some necessities that emerge for the youngest European state, that can not be easily harmonized. On one hand, there is the necessity to appear as a country that is fully integrated into the Western standards, and consequently without any kind of “ethnic nationalism” inside that could maintain a constant conflict with the minorities, and that could throw the country back into an atmosphere of ethnic hate, as it happened in the ex Yugoslavia during the ’90-s. For the realisation of such project, the Nation should appear– if we used a nice definition of Stéphane Pierre-Caps (2001, p. 36) – “as an expression of a unified and homogenous political society, whose undividable component is the citizen himself”. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that it guarantees equal rights to every citizen, as the states of Western Europe did long time before , the newborn independent state needs to acquire an identity through a Montenegrin nation easily recognizable for some specific cultural characteristics, such as the language – that those who say to belong to a Montenegrin nation would like to be the Montenegrin language – and religion (Rudović, 2007), with their own autocephalous Church (12); such needs are firmly refused by ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities of the country, and could take Montenegro far away from a civic state model, candidate to Europe, that was presented during the referendum campaign in order to make it attractive to the non-Serb minorities communities, since at the time it was necessary to seek for approval of the independence project in the majority of habitants.
    The minority ethno-national components demand a specific juridical recognition, despite of being a part of “a society that does not refuse the State, or the Nation… [they tend to] … design a state model that opposes completely the National state” (Pierre-Caps, 2001, p. 46). The latter could be assimilated, proportionally, to the precedent Yugoslav federation, based on the recognition of nationalities that are different from the state, where the protection of their collective rights was put before the protection of citizens’ individual rights.






1.	The EU “dictated the rules” by adopting the indications expressed in December 2005 by the “Venice Commission”, the consulting body of the European Council, over the way the voting should be done. It was decided that the vote would have been valid if at least 50% of voters took part at the consultation, and that the independence parties would have won by obtaining 55% of consents among valid votes. On May 21st 2006, 419.240 electors took part at the referendum, which meant 86,49% of voters; there were 230.661 votes in favour of the independence, which corresponded to 55,5%. So, the independence had been reached with only 0.5% point over the quorum, with 2.300 votes more than those in favour of the union. A matter of discussion between those in favour of independence and their opponents in favour of the union in the months that preceded the consultation, was the criteria of admission to the vote. The “unionists” would have preferred if Montenegrins resident abroad were allowed to vote – and among these, 264.000 in Serbia, mainly in favour of the federation; and more, they would have wanted to exclude the internal national minorities, because the right to chose should have been a prerogative of “real Montenegrins”. None of their two requests had been accepted by the international powers, although neither did the request of the “independentists” , that wanted a simple majority of 50% plus one of votes to legitimize the exit from the federation with Serbia, instead of a “qualified” majority of 55%. The danger avoided with only a bit more than 2.000 votes could have been having a majority of votes in favour of independence, but without a 55% quorum; in such case, there could have been the risk of a profound fracture inside the country, with both parts declaring victory (see Crisis Group Europe Report N° 169; Crisis Group Europe Briefing N° 42).
2.	Secession right included, according to what the 1946 Federal Constitution said. Given the right to auto-determination to the peoples, by this Constitution and successive constitutional revisions until the 1974 one, it could be seen that such right could not be of republics’ competence (see Cermel, 2002, pp. 25-26; Rinaldi, 2002, p. 82; Sekulić, 2002, p. 49). In fact the Yugoslav 1974 Constitution, art. 1, explicitly says that “The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state of free peoples and their Socialist Republics…”. Only the April 27th 1992 Constitution – approved when the federal state was reduced to two republics only – shows an inverted tendency, and puts the citizens’ rights before collective rights of nations or peoples (at art. 1).
3.	Successively it was impossible not to recognize also the unilateral secessions of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Macedonia, even if the first one did not have a national community with an absolute numeric majority among the population; in fact, between wars that each republic did after its independence, the longest and most destructive was the one that started in Bosnia and Hercegovina, a country that could only count on its weak independence forces that were also divided internally into the Bošnjak-Muslim and Croat nation, and that suffered the armed reaction of the federal army at first, and successively of the Bosnian Serbs. 
4.	It can be seen how, considering the declared percentage, the presented data does not represent the situation with arithmetic precision, but is only an indicator. 
5.	With the art. XXVIII of the Berlin Congress, based on the uti possedetis principle, it annexed the regions of Piva, Drobnjak, Banjani, Jezera, Šaranci, a part of Vasojevići, Kuči and Uskoci, the cities of Podgorica, Nikšić, Spuž, Žabljak, Crnojevića, Kolašin and Gusinje; the Principality also gained access to the sea along the coast between the river Željeznica and Kruči gulf, where Bar is situated, and it almost doubled its surface, from 4.400 kmq before the Congress, to 8.665 (Andrijašević, 2006, pp. 111-112).
6.	In La questione jugoslava, Giunti, Firenze, 1996; the mentioned paragraph is reported in Montalbetti, 2002, pp. 61-62.
7.	On June 3rd 2006,the day of independence proclamation, Montenegro’s Parliament declared that the Republic “….will continue to develop as a civic state, multiethnic, multicultural and multi-confessional society, founded on the respect and protection of human freedoms and rights, minority rights…”. In this declaration can be found also the wish for a rapid integration into the EU and for an adhesion to the NATO, signs of a Western orientation. And more, political elections held on September 10th 2006 gave 41 of 81 available parliament seats to the government coalition that at the time was guided by Ðukanović, while the votes of national, linguistic and religious minorities went mainly to the opposition parties, divided following certain ethno-national lines.
8.	The latter has to be sustained by maintaining the Albanian as the language used in education system, and also there must be radio-tv channels in such language.
9.	Even in that case we need to know the difference between cultural protection when it comes to customs that could disappear, and minority languages that need to be protected – because every citizen must have the right not only to speak its own mother language, but also to see it recognized by the institutions he identifies himself in – and protection from a political point of view of national communities, that could lead to a progressive weakening of the state and to partial loss of its own identity, especially in the case of a young country such as Montenegro, with its institutions that are yet to be solidified.
10.	Whose draft of 146 articles, comprehensive of amendments  proposed by the national minorities components, is published online in English at the OSCE site: http://www.osce.org/montenegro/ (​http:​/​​/​www.osce.org​/​montenegro​/​​) 
11.	The original word was velikosrpski, that despite its literal meaning “great Serbian”, can be translated as “superSerbian”, in order to reproduce the wish for grandeur of the Serbs that Spadijer wanted to refer to.
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